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ABSTRACT
This study addresses factors associated with active (corruption) and passive (inefficiency) waste that occur in the process of public mana-
gement and focuses on public health expenditure. Seeking to draw attention to the occurrence of passive waste, this study investigated the 
following question: what factors of active and passive waste are associated with irregularities in the management of the funds allocated by 
the Federal Government to Brazilian municipalities for healthcare in 2010? Empirical evidence relating to 102 audited municipalities was 
obtained from the audit reports of the Office of the Comptroller General (Controladoria Geral da União - CGU), which was established 
in 2010. Three variables were analyzed for the identification of active waste, and 17 variables were used for passive waste. Data pertaining 
to the variables were subjected to factor analysis and grouped into factors statistically associated with irregularities in the management of 
public health funds in the audited municipalities. For active waste, the study results did not show an adequate level of significance, whe-
reas for passive waste, three factors were identified: Factor 1, Administrative Inadequacy, which included the variables “non-payment of 
taxes”, “non-occurrence of matching funds” and “mismanagement”; Factor 2, Weak Supervision, which included the variables “lack of or 
poor performance of the council” and “fractional bidding” and Factor 3, Low Level of Compliance, which included the variables “irregular 
bidding” and “irregularities not related to the mayor”. The main conclusion of the study is the identification of the need to implement 
governance mechanisms in the public sector that could reduce active and passive waste. 
Keywords: Public funds management, active waste, passive waste, factor analysis, public governance.
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 1 InTROduCTIOn
Following the unification of the Brazilian health sys-
tem with the implementation of the Unified Health Sys-
tem (Sistema Único de Saúde, SUS) in 1988, the system 
ceased to be the responsibility of several ministries. The 
management of the SUS was decentralized and no lon-
ger exclusive to the Federal Executive Branch, making 
it the responsibility of state and municipal administra-
tions. To that end, states and municipalities now recei-
ve federal funds to be applied to government programs 
and actions. SUS data are striking; the system carries out 
2.8 billion outpatient procedures, 19,000 transplants, 
236,000 heart surgeries, 9.7 million chemotherapy and 
radiotherapy procedures and 11 million hospitalizations 
annually (Portal Brasil, 2009).
The numbers cited above are of course significant, 
especially if one considers that the amount paid direc-
tly by the population served is zero. However, the public 
health system in Brazil still faces problems. Magazines, 
newspapers and news broadcasting frequently report 
corruption1  at the municipal, state, national and inter-
national levels. Examples, both old and new, abound on 
the subject, such as the case that came to light in 2011 
regarding the Hospital Complex of Sorocaba (Conjunto 
Hospitalar de Sorocaba, São Paulo), which is responsi-
ble for serving 48 municipalities in the region. After an 
operation by the Public Ministry in conjunction with the 
Civil Police of Sorocaba, 12 people (including directors, 
physicians and dentists) who were suspected of fraudu-
lent bids and of diverting funds from public health were 
arrested (Benites, 2011).
At the same time, acting as a silent disease, another 
type of waste of public funds exists that cannot be dis-
regarded: the inefficiency2  of public management (also 
called mismanagement or, in this study, “passive waste”). 
This type of inefficiency may involve work that lasts for 
months longer than planned, medicines that are pur-
chased but not distributed before expiry, the absence 
of effective use of equipment received, or other types of 
mismanagement (Controladoria Geral da União, 2011). 
Unlike corruption, this second type of waste receives lit-
tle attention in the media or even in academic papers. 
However, a recent study by Bandiera, Prat and Valletti 
(2009) showed that, in Italy, passive waste represented 
83% of the total waste of public money that occurred 
with respect to the acquisition of goods.
According to Ferraz, Finan and Moreira (2008, p. 2), 
such diversions of funds in areas of education, health and 
sanitation "... generate high costs to society because they 
reduce the accumulation of human capital and accentuate 
inequality given that poorer households depend more on 
public services."
There is some degree of consensus that Brazil’s health 
service is one of the most important public services pro-
vided to the population. This was demonstrated in a stu-
dy conducted by the Research Institute for Supplementary 
Health (Instituto de Estudos de Saúde Suplementar, IESS) 
in eight brazilian metropolitan areas. The study concluded 
that after home ownership the second most sought-after 
goal of the average Brazilian is to provide his or her family 
with a health plan (Rose, 2011).
That the importance of public health is recognized by 
the government is shown by the fact that public health is 
the subject of one of the thirteen Government Guidelines. 
The current President of Brazil, Dilma Rousseff, pledged in 
target nine "to universalize health and guarantee the quali-
ty of care in SUS". The priority of this target, according to 
Portal Brasil (2011), is to improve “SUS and the manage-
ment, supervision and quality control mechanisms of the 
services it provides (...)".
In summary, given its significance to the welfare of the 
population, health care is an area that should receive more 
attention from government agencies. Proper financial ma-
nagement of public funds as a whole is therefore necessary, 
assuming basic presuppositions such as the principles of 
legality, impersonality, morality, public transparency and 
efficiency as envisaged in Article 37 of the Federal Cons-
titution of 1988.
The occurrence of active and passive waste of funds 
in public administration at the national and international 
levels has been documented in Hart, Shleifer and Vishny 
(1997), Di Tella and Schargrodsky (2003), Reinikka and 
Svensson (2005), Ferraz et al. (2008, 2012), Bandiera et al. 
(2009), Sodré and Alves (2010) and Motta (2010). Data on 
such waste can also be found in the reports of the Office 
of the Comptroller General (Controladoria Geral da União 
- CGU), which has conducted on-site inspections in Bra-
zilian municipalities with up to 500,000 inhabitants since 
2003. These inspections have indicated irregularities in 
several areas of public administration that receive federal 
funds, with those in the health sector being of special inte-
rest to this study.
As explained thus far, there are several problems in the 
application of funds in the health sector that could be sol-
ved or at least alleviated with good public governance, as 
advocated by Lewis (2006), who states that the literature 
dealing with governance and corruption ignores the field 
of social policy. This is a gap that must be filled to make 
it possible to use these funds efficiently because even pro-
perly conducted expenditures may in the end have no im-
pact if priorities are not met because institutions are not 
working (LEWIS, 2006).
This brings us to the following research question: 
What factors of active and passive waste were associated 
with irregularities in the management of funds allocated 
by the Federal Government to municipalities for health-
care in 2010?
1 According to Matias-Pereira (2002, p. 3), corruption, which is called “active waste” for the purposes of this study,  "occurs when the activity of the civil servant or politician is not based on the promotion of the general 
interest", i.e., when a private entity obtains financial advantage at the expense of financial loss to the public entity.
2 Inefficiency, which is called ‘passive waste’ for the purposes of this study, occurs when public funds are negatively impacted but there is no financial benefit to a private entity in return.
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This study aims to identify the active and passive waste 
factors that are most associated with irregularities in the 
management of municipal funds allocated by the Federal 
Government in the area of health care.
The primary issue to be addressed in the study is pas-
sive waste, which may be responsible for most of the un-
necessary public expenditure, as already mentioned.  
Thus, this study aims to contribute to the mana-
gement and auditing of public funds in healthcare at 
three levels: awareness, prevention and restraint. Awa-
reness refers to the awareness of the society in general 
regarding the existence of passive waste that affects the 
provision of public services, and that, similarly to ac-
tive waste, has a negative impact on the use of public 
funds. Prevention is addressed in the sense that clearly 
identifying the factors that negatively affect public he-
alth expenditure makes it possible to create a program 
that targets the qualifications of municipal managers 
and civil servants. Restraint can contribute to the mo-
nitoring of funds allocated to municipalities by the fe-
deral government for healthcare; by making it possible 
to identify active and passive waste factors, government 
auditors can create specific tests to address them.
This paper will be presented according to the follo-
wing structure: the first section, the introduction, will 
contextualize and justify the problem and objective of 
the study; in the second section, a literature review will 
be presented; this will be followed by a description of the 
methodology used, empirical analysis, conclusions and, 
finally, a reference list, annex and appendix.
 2 LITeRATuRe RevIeW
 2.1 The Challenge of Resource Optimization.
In private entities, unnecessary expenditure in the pro-
duction of a good or the provision of a service, i.e., waste, 
is related to an essential point on which the survival of a 
business depends: the issue of resource optimization. In 
environments in which there is fierce competition, organi-
zations are required to do more with less to gain customers 
who constantly demand more, expecting high-quality pro-
ducts at a lower price.
An example of the need for resource management can 
be found in private healthcare, where studies have identi-
fied the professionalization of hospital management, whi-
ch now adopts modern management tools similar to those 
that are commonly used in other businesses. That practice 
seeks to unite efforts to achieve excellence in service provi-
sion which, in turn, generates customer satisfaction and a 
consequent increase in income, as in the case of the imple-
mentation of the Balanced Scorecard in hospitals (Carva-
lho, Dias and Prochnik, 2005).
However, in regard to services and goods provided by 
the State, the issue of waste does not seem to receive as 
much attention, perhaps because the state faces no com-
petition in the area of providing healthcare or because the 
"value" paid for the public service by the citizen is not di-
rectly related to the services that are consumed by him/her, 
the latter being a characteristic of government, according 
to Niyama and Silva (2011).
According to studies conducted by Oliveira (2002) 
and Reis, Slomski, Pereira and Mello (2007), public 
accounting is a subject little studied in Brazil; thus, it 
does not contribute as much as it might to improving 
the quality of information related to the disposition of 
public funds, which belong to all Brazilians. Thus, the 
evaluation of investments made by the state and the re-
turn brought by the programs the state develops, which 
have as their main goal the continuous improvement 
of quality of life, may be insufficiently or inefficiently 
evaluated. 
 2.2  Theoretical Structure of Active and Passive 
Waste according to Bandiera, Prat and 
valletti (2009).
According to Bandiera et al. (2009), passive waste oc-
curs when there is an unnecessary expense to the public 
entity but the civil servant or manager involved does not 
obtain financial advantage from it. Active waste, in turn, is 
corruption in which the individual obtains private benefit, 
causing a loss to public funds, for example when overinvoi-
cing occurs in the contracting of a public service (Bandiera, 
Prat, & Valletti, 2009.)
To develop a theoretical framework for studying acti-
ve waste and passive waste, Bandiera et al. (2009) used the 
example of the work of a purchasing manager of a public 
entity who must purchase a certain amount of a product 
for which the public entity can pay a certain price. In this 
case, two things may happen: the first is that the manager 
receives a direct benefit, a "kickback", when carrying out 
the transaction, which raises the price and hence increa-
ses public spending (active waste); the second is that the 
manager is inefficient and is unable to optimize the price 
(passive waste).
The underlying theoretical questions are, first, what 
leads to the occurrence or not of the first possibility and, 
second, what causes the efficiency or inefficiency of the 
manager in the second instance?
A plausible theoretical hypothesis related to efficiency 
in public spending is as follows: "The purchasing mana-
ger feels a pressure to keep prices low" (Bandiera et al., 
2009, p. 1284). According to these authors, a manager’s 
seeking to keep prices low may be due to a genuine mo-
tivation to maximize the use of public money because 
the manager is aware of the negative consequences of 
paying high prices when purchasing products and servi-
ces. At the same time, inefficiency may occur due to low 
or inadequate knowledge on the part of the purchasing 
manager or even due to "laziness", according to Bandiera 
et al. (2009, p. 1284).
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A plausible theoretical hypothesis related to active 
waste, which also applies with respect to managers who 
receive "kickbacks", is as follows: "The purchasing mana-
ger may also like private benefits" (Bandiera et al., 2009, 
p. 1284). However, the authors argue that the pursuit of 
private benefits is influenced by the risk of punishment. 
For example, in public entities operating in environ-
ments in which there is a culture of whistleblowing, the 
risk is higher than in environments in which the habit 
of denouncing managers does not exist (Bandiera et al., 
2009, p. 1284).
Another aspect that may limit overinvoicing as 
a form of active waste is the way in which corporate 
governance is exercised within a governmental entity, 
to the extent that governance mechanisms can create 
restrictions or make rules less flexible regarding pur-
chases, thus hindering increases in prices by managers 
(Bandiera et al., 2009, p. 1284).
In summary, in terms of the theoretical approach dis-
cussed above, procurement management within govern-
ment entities can provide those responsible for purchases 
within government entities may aggregate more or less 
costs or incentives to deal with prices in procurement 
management within government entities. 
 2.3  Previous Studies.
The study developed by Bandiera et al. (2009), who 
are researchers at the London School of Economics and 
Imperial College London, calls attention to passive waste. 
These authors found empirically that of the total waste 
that occurred in the acquisition of goods by the gover-
nment of Italy, passive waste, i.e., expenses generated by 
inefficiencies in public administration, accounted for 83% 
of unnecessary expenses.
Other studies that addressed this issue were con-
ducted by Hart et al. (1997), Di Tella and Schargrodsky 
(2003), Reinikka and Svensson (2005), Ferraz, Finan 
and Moreira (2008, 2012), Sodré and Alves (2010) and 
Motta (2010). It should be noted that according to Ban-
diera et al. (2009), the theory dealing with passive wa-
ste is newer and less developed than that dealing with 
active waste.
Hart et al. (1997, p. 1127 and 1131), researchers at 
Harvard University and the University of Chicago, rai-
sed the following question: What is the efficiency of 
the government in provision of public services? Such 
a question is valid when its answer, based on concrete 
data, is able to support the decision of a public manager 
to provide a specific service or outsource it to private 
institutions. To answer this question, the authors deve-
loped a mathematical model that was used to analyze 
the cost-benefit relationship of privatization. As pri-
mary research, they applied the model to the prisons of 
the United States of America (USA) and secondarily to 
other public services.
Hart et al. (1997, p. 1159) noted:
“Our theoretical arguments suggest that the case for in-
house provision is generally stronger when non-con-
tractible cost reductions have large deleterious effects 
on quality, when quality innovations are unimportant 
and when corruption in government procurement is a 
severe problem. In contrast, the case for privatization 
is stronger when quality-reducing cost reductions can 
be controlled through contract or competition, when 
quality innovations are important and when patronage 
and powerful unions are a severe problem inside the 
government.”
Hart et al. (1997) concluded that privatization is 
more appropriate than in-house provision, noting, ho-
wever, that because of the high rate of violence, which 
makes it necessary to use force more often, privatiza-
tion would not be appropriate in maximum security 
prisons. The application of the model to other sectors 
showed that the outsourcing of public services in the 
areas of foreign policy, police and the armed forces is 
not appropriate but that such outsourcing is appropria-
te for garbage collection services, weapons production 
and, to a reasonable extent, for schools. For healthcare, 
the authors report that a more detailed model would 
be required so that a more informed conclusion could 
be drawn.
Following the theme of waste of public funds but tur-
ning to healthcare, Di Tella and Schargrodsky (2003), 
of Harvard University and Torcuato Di Tella Universi-
ty (Universidad Torcuato Di Tella), conducted a study 
in which they found that there was a reduction of ap-
proximately 10% in the amounts paid in 1996 and 1997 
for basic supplies by public hospitals in Buenos Aires, 
Argentina, due to suppression of corruption during this 
period through hospital audits. At the same time, the au-
thors studied the relationship between the wages paid 
to employees who performed acquisitions in the hospi-
tals and the occurrence of audits. They concluded that 
simply improving wages did not affect the efficiency of 
the service provided nor did a demonstrative policy of 
auditing solve the problem, considering the medium and 
long term. The authors found that both the implemen-
tation of the wage policy and an intensification of audits 
were required to produce an effect. 
A study by Reinikka and Svensson (2005) of the 
World Bank and the Institute for International Econo-
mic Studies of Stockholm University sought to identi-
fy the most effective ways to increase enrollment and 
learning in primary schools. To that end, they con-
ducted a study in Uganda in which they analyzed the 
government's strategy of publishing monthly data on 
the transfer of public funds to educational institutions 
in national newspapers, thereby facilitating public ac-
cess to and understanding of information about captu-
re of funds and bringing about greater public oversight. 
The government decided to increase transparency ins-
tead of increasing funds, reasoning that an increase in 
funds would not necessarily solve the problem because 
it has already been shown that in many poor countries 
legal institutions are among the most corrupt institu-
tions. When the analysis was completed, the authors 
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found that not only had enrollment and academic per-
formance improved, but capture of funds for schools 
had also increased, demonstrating that "(..) public ac-
cess to information can indeed be a powerful deterrent 
to capture of resources at the local level" according to 
Reinikka and Svensson (2004, p. 4).
Using data from Brazil, Ferraz et al. (2008, 2012), rese-
archers at the Catholic University of Rio de Janeiro (Pon-
tifícia Universidade Católica do Rio de Janeiro), the Uni-
versity of California at Berkeley and Harvard University, 
studied the relationship between corruption (active waste) 
and mismanagement (passive waste) based on the results 
of the Prova Brasil [National system of elementary school 
assessment] in Portuguese and mathematics. They conclu-
ded that active and passive waste not only led to significant 
reductions in students' scores on these tests but that they 
also affected school indicators, reducing the approval rate 
and increasing the student dropout rate. 
Sodré and Alves (2010), researchers from the Massa-
chusetts Institute of Technology, the University of Brasília 
(Universidade de Brasília - UnB) and the CGU, reviewed 
the audit reports of the CGU public lottery seeking to ve-
rify the relationship between parliamentary amendments 
and signs of municipal corruption found in the reports. At 
the end of the study, the authors concluded that munici-
palities that obtained funds from such amendments have 
25% more cases of corruption on average than municipali-
ties that did not obtain such funds. The authors also drew 
attention to the inefficiency of municipal public manage-
ment, noting that such inefficiency often occurs not only 
because of a lack of technical skill on the part of public 
managers or civil servants but also as a result of deliberate 
attempts to "disguise" corruption.
Another study conducted in Brazil by Motta (2010) at 
the State University of Campinas (Universidade Estadual de 
Campinas) analyzed the contribution of the public procu-
rement system under the Direct Administration of the Exe-
cutive Branch (Administração Direta do Poder Executivo) 
to creating more efficient expenditure, i.e., reducing passi-
ve waste. Motta (2010, p. ix) concluded that "the Brazilian 
system of procurement does not contribute substantially to 
improving the efficiency of federal public spending".
 2.4 Accounting, Governance and Combating 
Active and Passive Waste.
In its application in the public arena, accounting should 
not be regarded only as an obligation to be fulfilled or as an 
instrument for the recording of acts and events that occur 
within public administration. Instead, it should be regar-
ded as a tool that can be used to objectively support the 
verification of actions performed by public managers and 
to ensure that these actions show respect for the principles 
set forth in the Constitution, thus making it a governan-
ce mechanism that provides a basis for the investigation of 
how public money has been used.
Governance can be used as an instrument to fight cor-
ruption and inefficiency in the public sector to the extent 
that, according to Mimicopoulos, Kyj and Sormani (2007, 
p. iii), it "refers to the formal and informal arrangements 
that determine how public decisions are made and how pu-
blic actions are carried out from the perspective of maintai-
ning a country’s constitutional values". In the area of public 
health, Lewis (2006) states that good governance leads to 
effectiveness and efficiency, generating economic growth, 
among other things. Thus, public governance meets the ob-
jective of combating waste of public funds and can provide 
a form of control of those in power (Matias-Pereira, 2005).
The audits conducted by the CGU in the Brazilian 
municipalities constitute governance mechanisms that 
are responsible for verifying the proper implementation 
of previously established public programs and the proper 
management of expenditures related to these programs. 
Moreover, the municipal health councils also act as gover-
nance mechanisms because the citizens' participation in 
the preparation of guidelines for health policy, which in-
cludes monitoring health actions and supervising the use 
of funds in this area, is guaranteed through them. If both 
governance mechanisms work effectively, they can achieve 
lower levels of waste of public funds because they increase 
the risk of discovery of public managers' irregular acts and 
increase the likelihood of punishment for these actions.
The work of the auditor and governance are comple-
mentary in overseeing the performance of the public ma-
nager and directing him/her towards meeting the needs of 
the population. This relevance is expressed in CFC [Con-
selho Federal de Contabilidade (Federal Accounting Coun-
cil)] Resolution No. 1,209/09, which concerns the auditor's 
communication with those responsible for governance. 
From the perspective of this resolution, following the prin-
ciples of good governance, the auditors (for the purposes of 
this study, the auditors are understood to be CGU auditors) 
should regularly participate in the meetings of the muni-
cipal council, which is defined in this study as a type of 
audit committee of the public sector. In addition, the presi-
dent of the municipal council should have regular meetings 
with the auditors, and the city council should meet with the 
auditor without management present at least once a year 
(CFC Resolution No. 1,209/09). Given its relevance, com-
munication between the CGU auditors and those responsi-
ble for governance in the municipalities, as recommended 
in CFC Resolution no. 1,209/09, is an object that should be 
investigated empirically.
 3 MeTHOdOLOGICAL PROCeduReS
To achieve the general objective of this paper, a literature 
search was initially performed to determine what points are 
being discussed nationally and internationally on the subject 
and to serve as the basis for the classification of variables. 
Then, the Reports of the Auditors of the CGU Auditing Pro-
gram by Public Lotteries (Programa de Fiscalização por Sor-
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teios Públicos) were used for the identification of active and 
passive waste in municipal public health expenditures. 
The reports prepared by the CGU were chosen becau-
se they were intended to analyze the application of federal 
funds in the municipalities through on-site visits that in-
cluded physical and documentary inspections, interviews, 
application of questionnaires and photographic records, 
among others. The Government programs were the subject 
of supervisory actions performed by the Supervisor Minis-
try (i.e., it is possible to identify the specific analysis related 
to the municipality's health expenditures), specifying the 
number of inspections carried out and the funds applied.
It should be noted that, despite the fact that the CGU 
reports represent a source of technical (not scientific) data, 
they have been used in scientific studies to build research 
databases that address corruption and/or inefficiency. These 
databases include those of Sodré and Alves (2010), Peixoto, 
Rocha, Nishijima and Pstali (2012), Avelino, Barberia and 
Biderman (2013) as well as the studies developed by Ferraz 
and Finan (2007, 2011) and Ferraz et al. (2008, 2012).
The initial sample comprised 120 Brazilian municipali-
ties audited in the 31st and 32nd CGU lotteries, which oc-
curred in 2010. Municipalities that did not receive funding 
from the Ministry of Health were excluded, resulting in a 
final sample of 102 municipalities. 
The variables classifying active and passive waste used in 
this study are the same as those used by Ferraz et al. (2008) 
based on Ferraz and Finan (2007)3  and are presented below. 
 Table 1  Classification of active and passive waste
ACTIVE WASTE
Nº Acronym Variable Description
1 OI Overinvoicing Occurs when the prices paid are above the market price or when the amount purchased 
far exceeds the needs of the municipality.
2 BDF Bidding with diversion of funds Occurs when there is evidence that the service bidded and paid for has not been provided.
3 DF Diversion of funds Occurs in cases in which there is expenditure without proof that the physical part or service was 
provided.
PASSIVE WASTE
Nº Acronym Variable Description
1 NPT Non-payment of taxes Occurs when the city hall fails to pay taxes.
2 NUF Non-use of funds Occurs when the Federal Government allocates money but the municipality does not use it.
3 UW Unfinished work Occurs when the mayor leaves work unfinished and pays for the corresponding portion.
4 LPPC Lack of or poor performance of the council Occurs when the health council does not supervise spending in the area.
5 Client Clientelism Occurs when the mayor spends public funds with the explicit purpose of getting votes. 
6 IISP Irregular implementation of social programs Occurs when the control or registration of social programs is irregular.
7 WE White elephant Occurs when there is construction or purchase of property disproportionate to the needs of 
the municipality.
8 IB Irregular bidding Occurs when there is an irregularity in the bidding documents.
9 FB Fractional bidding Occurs when the mayor splits expenditures to be made across different bids so as to chan-
ge the type of bid required according to regulations provided for by law.
10 LCB Lack of competitive bidding Occurs when bidding has not been performed with a minimum of three competitors.
11 NB Nepotistic bidding Occurs when the mayor uses relatives or third parties in the bidding process for his/her own 
benefit.
12 CPSS Change of purpose for the same sector Occurs when the fund is used in the health sector but for a different purpose than that 
originally agreed upon with the Federal Government.
13 CPAS Change of purpose to another sector Occurs when the fund is used in another sector for a different purpose than that originally 
agreed upon with the Federal Government.
14 NMF Non-occurrence of matching funds Occurs when the municipality does not provide a matching funds contribution. 
15 WFI Work finished irregularly Occurs when the work is performed in its entirety but with some minor irregularities.
16 INRM Irregularity not related to the mayor Occurs when there are irregularities that are not the responsibility of the mayor.
17 MM Mismanagement Includes any other irregularity noted by the CGU that does not fit any of the other above criteria.
Source: Compiled from variables of Ferraz et al. (2008, p. 13).
To prepare the database, a matrix was created in Excel 
in which each row contained one of the municipalities in 
the sample and each column contained one of the waste 
variables described above. A reading was performed of the 
CGU audit reports for each of the audited municipalities, 
and every irregularity found regarding a specific munici-
pality was classified in the corresponding column. At the 
end, the total number of irregularities found for each of 
the active and passive waste variables was totaled for each 
municipality, thereby creating a database with the findings 
of irregularities (or "points"4 ) in healthcare in each mu-
nicipality in the sample. Appendix 1 lists some examples 
of information classification based on the variables in the 
CGU report.
3 For more details about the construction of these variables, please see Ferraz et al. (2008) and Ferraz and Finan (2011).
4 The term "point" is used in the audit to refer to irregularities found by carrying out the work.
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Subsequently, empirical analysis was performed by 
applying multivariate factor analysis (FA) to determine 
which active and passive waste factors were associated 
with irregularities in the management of funds allocated 
by the Federal Government to municipalities for heal-
thcare in 2010. FA is a multivariate statistical technique 
that seeks to identify a relatively small number of com-
mon factors that can be used to represent relationships 
between a large number of correlated variables (Fávero, 
Belfiore, Silva & Chan, 2009). 
For FA to be applied, the data must follow a multivaria-
te normal distribution. However, Hair, Anderson, Tatham 
and Black (2009) argue that although univariate normality 
does not guarantee multivariate normality, if all variables 
meet this condition, any deviations from multivariate nor-
mality are usually innocuous. To meet this assumption, the 
Box-Cox transformation was applied to the data for the 
following variables: i) active waste: bidding with diversion 
of funds (BDF) and diversion of funds (DF); ii) passive wa-
ste: irregular bidding (IB), change of purpose for the same 
sector (CPSS), non-occurrence of matching funds (NMF) 
and mismanagement (MM).
After assessing the normality of the data, the follo-
wing procedures were followed, in line with Fávero, Bel-
fiore, Silva and Chan (2009) and Field (2009): i) analysis 
of the correlation matrix, which should reveal a subs-
tantial number of significant correlations (p <0.05); ii) 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) statistical analysis (the clo-
ser a value is to 1, the more appropriate the use of this 
technique); iii) Bartlett's test of sphericity, which evalua-
tes the hypothesis that the correlation matrix may be the 
identity matrix’ and iv) analysis of the measure of sam-
pling adequacy (MSA) (the value of this measure should 
be greater than 0.50).
The method used to obtain the factors was principal 
component analysis (PCA), which was used to summarize 
most of the data variance into a minimum number of fac-
tors. The Kaiser criterion, which considers all factors with 
eigenvalues less than 1 to be insignificant, indicating that 
they should be discarded, was used to determine the num-
ber of factors to extract. Once extracted, the factors were 
rotated by the Varimax method of orthogonal rotation. 
To perform the factor analysis, IBM SPSS Statistical sof-
tware version 20 was used.
 4  eMPIRICAL AnALySIS
To meet the assumptions of the factor analysis, the nor-
mality of the data was first verified; Box-Cox transforma-
tions were then applied to the variables that did not have 
normal distributions. After transformation, it was possible 
to verify that all variables related to active and passive waste 
followed a normal distribution (p > 0.05) at a significance 
level of 5% (Table 2).
 Table 2  Descriptive measures and Kolmogorov-Smirnov (KS) normality test for active and passive waste data relating to 
irregularities in the management of funds allocated by the Federal Government to municipalities for healthcare in 2010
Type Waste Mean Standard deviation Minimum Median Maximum KS p
Active
OI 0.42 0.76 0.00 0.00 3.00 0.07 >0.15
BDF 0.67 1.18 0.00 0.00 6.00 0.08 >0.09
DF 1.90 1.95 0.00 1.00 10.00 0.05 >0.150
Passive
NPT 0.09 0.45 0.00 0.00 4.00 0.06 >0.15
NUF 0.05 0.26 0.00 0.00 2.00 0.05 >0.15
UW 0.21 0.59 0.00 0.00 4.00 0.07 >0.15
LPPC 0.46 0.56 0.00 0.00 3.00 0.08 >0.15
Client 0.01 0.10 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.05 >0.15
IISP 0.64 0.95 0.00 0.00 4.00 0.09 0.09
WE 0.05 0.22 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.07 >0.15
IB 1.78 2.29 0.00 1.00 12.00 0.05 >0.15
FB 0.13 0.39 0.00 0.00 2.00 0.08 >0.15
LCB 0.18 0.43 0.00 0.00 2.00 0.09 >0.15
NB 0.02 0.14 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.05 >0.15
CPSS 1.06 1.23 0.00 1.00 4.00 0.08 >0.15
CPAS 0.20 0.60 0.00 0.00 4.00 0.06 >0.15
NMF 0.85 1.10 0.00 1.00 6.00 0.08 >0.15
WFI 0.13 0.44 0.00 0.00 3.00 0.08 >0.15
INRM 0.02 0.14 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.06 >0.15
MM 9.73 5.62 1.00 8.00 30.00 0.06 >0.15
Legend: OI: Overinvoicing; BDF: Bidding with diversion of funds; DF: Diversion of funds; NPT: Non-payment of taxes; NUF: Non-use of funds; UW: Unfinished 
work; LPPC: Lack of or poor performance of the council; Client: Clientelism; IISP: Irregular implementation of social programs; WE: White Elephant; IB: Irregular 
bidding; FB: Fractional bidding; LCB: Lack of competitive bidding; NB: Nepotistic bidding; CPSS: Change of purpose for the same sector; CPAS: Change of purpose 
to another sector; NMF: Non-occurrence of matching funds; WFI: Work finished irregularly; INRM: Irregularity not related to the mayor; MM: Mismanagement. 
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Subsequently, the correlation matrix of active waste data 
was examined, revealing that of the three pairs of variables, 
only one showed a correlation (Table 3).





Regarding passive waste, it was found that the va-
riables IISP, Client, LCB, NB, CPAS, NUF, UW, CPSS, 
WE and WFI did not exhibit a considerable number of 
significant correlations with the other variables; the-
refore, these variables were removed from the factor 
analysis (Field, 2009). 
Table 4 shows the correlation matrix for the varia-
bles that remained in the analysis. Significant correla-
tions were found between NPT and NMF and between 
NPT and MM. LPPC showed significant correlations 
with FB, NMF, INRM and MM, and IB was significan-
tly correlated with FB, INRM and MM. FB waste sho-
wed significant correlations with LPPC and NMF wa-
ste. NMF waste presented significant correlations with 
NPT, LPPC, FB and MM waste. INRM waste correlated 
significantly with LPPC and IB waste. In general, MM 
waste correlated with all other types of waste except FB 
and INPR.
 Table 4  Correlation matrix for passive waste data relating to irregularities in the management of funds allocated by the 
Federal Government to municipalities for healthcare in 2010
NPT LPPC IB FB NMF INRM
LPPC 0.07      
IB 0.10 0.07     
FB 0.05 0.27* 0.15    
NMF 0.22* 0.19* 0.03 0.19*   
INRM 0.13 0.39* 0.24* 0.14 0.08  
MM 0.29* 0.21* 0.27* 0.11 0.30* 0.14
*significant (p<0.05).
The values of the KMO statistic for active (0.54) and 
passive (0.61) waste indicate the adequacy of the sam-
pling for factor analysis. However, the significance level of 
Bartlett's test of sphericity for active waste (p = 0.102) in-
dicates that the correlation matrix is equal to the identity 
matrix. This, in turn, indicates that there are relationships 
between the active waste variables; factor analysis is there-
fore not appropriate for these data. For the passive waste 
variables, Bartlett's test is highly significant (p <0.001); the-
refore, factor analysis is appropriate (Table 5).
 Table 5  Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) test for active and 
passive waste data relating to irregularities in the management 
of the funds allocated by the Federal Government to 








Bartlett’s test of sphericity x2 68.65
p <0.001
Factors were retained by the Kaiser criterion. Because 
the factor solution extracts the factors in order of impor-
tance, Factor 1 explains the largest portion (21.78%) of the 
variance; Factor 2 explains 21.72%, and Factor 3 explains 
17.29%. Thus, 60.79% of the total variance in the factor 
matrix is represented by information contained in three 
factors (Table 6). 
The choice of which waste elements should compri-
se each factor was made taking into account the factor 
loadings of each type of waste from left to right along 
each row and selecting factor loadings with values gre-
ater than 0.50 for purposes of interpretation (Field, 
2009). By adopting this process, Factor 1 has three sig-
nificant loadings, Factor 2 has two, and Factor 3 also 
has two significant loadings (Table 6).
Factor 1 groups the variables “non-payment of taxes”, 
“non-occurrence of matching funds” and “mismanage-
ment” and is called “Administrative Inadequacy”. These 
variables were grouped together because they all represent 
negligence in the management of healthcare; that is, the 
money was available for use but the city hall failed to pay 
taxes, to apply a matching fund or to meet the necessary 
factors for good management. 
Factor 2 includes the variables “lack of or poor perfor-
mance of the council” and “fractional bidding” and is called 
“Weak Supervision”. With lack of or poor performance of 
the Municipal Health Council, the chance of irregularities 
related to management increases, for example because mo-
nitoring of acquisitions is not performed, which may re-
sult in the same acquisitions being carried out in fractional 
form throughout the year. 
Factor 3 includes the variables “irregular bidding” and 
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“irregularity not related to the mayor” and is called “Low 
Level of Compliance5  because in the case of both variables 
irregularities refer to non-compliance with the laws and 
regulations that support the operation and processes of pu-
blic administration.
 Table 6  Matrix of factor loadings derived using the Varimax method of orthogonal rotation for passive waste data relating 
to irregularities in the management of funds allocated by the Federal Government to municipalities for healthcare in 2010
Waste Factor Commonality MSA
1 2 3
NPT 0.72 -0.06 0.12 0.53 0.67
MM 0.71 0.10 0.31 0.61 0.63
NMF 0.68 0.34 -0.30 0.67 0.66
IB 0.18 0.01 0.83 0.72 0.53
FB 0.10 0.66 -0.04 0.45 0.65
LPPC 0.06 0.81 0.11 0.67 0.58
INRM -0.02 0.55 0.55 0.60 0.58
Eigenvalue 1.52 1.52 1.21
Variance (%) 21.78 21.72 17.29
Cumulative variance (%) 21.78 43.50 60.79
The highest commonality values were obtained for the 
variables IB (0.72), NMF (0.67) and LPPC (0.67), indica-
ting that these variables are important in explaining the 
total variability of the data. 
 5 COnCLuSIOnS
The objective of this study was to identify the active and 
passive waste factors that are most associated with irregu-
larities in the management of municipal funds allocated by 
the Federal Government of Brazil for healthcare. 
To achieve this objective, a theoretical and empirical 
study was conducted. In the first part of the study, the the-
oretical basis for the study was identified. In the empirical 
part, given the objective of the research, the multivariate 
technique of factor analysis was used.
The study results show that for active waste it is not 
possible, based on the data analyzed, to present a single 
most defining factor because the result of Bartlett's test 
was not significant. A likely cause of this outcome is the 
fact that only three variables were related to active was-
te. For passive waste, three factors were found that were 
most associated with irregularities. Factor 1 was called 
“Administrative Inadequacy” and grouped the variables 
"non-payment of taxes", "non-occurrence of matching 
funds" and "mismanagement". This factor confirms the 
findings of Bandiera et al. (2009), who found that there 
are inefficient public managers and managers who fail 
to optimize resources and that this can occur due to 
lack of the knowledge needed to perform the function 
or through being "lazy". One practical consequence of 
this problem occurs when the federal government fails 
to allocate funds relating to a program to be developed 
in a municipality because the latter has not provided the 
necessary matching funds, which sometimes represent a 
very small percentage of the total value of the program. 
It is noteworthy that there are cases in which the mu-
nicipality has the resources available and still does not 
provide the matching funds that have been agreed upon 
beforehand.
Factor 2 included the variables “lack or poor perfor-
mance of the council” and “fractional bidding” and is cal-
led “Weak Supervision”. A point to be clarified is that the 
Municipal Health Council is critical to the efficient provi-
sion of public healthcare due to its role in the formulation 
of strategies and in the control of policy implementation 
and economic and financial supervision of the area, whi-
ch, among other benefits, inhibits the occurrence of frac-
tional bidding. This factor, Weak Supervision, can lead to 
the occurrence of active waste, as noted in the literature by 
Bandiera et al. (2009), because civil servants and managers 
who have a tendency to seek private benefits do so pro-
portionally to the risk of punishment. According to a study 
by Di Tella and Schargrodsky (2003), addressing this fac-
tor through the effective action of the council could reduce 
passive waste.
Finally, Factor 3, “Low Level of Compliance”, encompas-
ses the variables "irregular bidding" and "irregularity not 
related to the mayor." This factor relates to non-compliance 
to previously established rules, standards and guidelines 
that could be avoided by the implementation of appropria-
te governance mechanisms, thus placing civil servants and 
managers under pressure to be efficient, as proposed by 
Bandiera et al. (2009).
The most important contribution of this study is that 
it reveals the need to draw the attention of academia, go-
vernment and society in general to the existence of passi-
ve waste that currently affects the quality of services pro-
vided to the population, has a negative impact on public 
5 Compliance refers to the level of compliance of something with previously established laws, regulations, policies and guidelines.
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funds and may consume up to 4 times more of the allo-
cated resources than active waste, such as in the Italian 
case identified by Bandiera et al. (2009). Furthermore, 
passive waste can be used to conceal active waste, as noted 
by Sodré and Alves (2010). As a practical consequence of 
this study, theoretical and empirical arguments have been 
identified that suggest that passive waste can be reduced 
through a series of actions such as (i) increased supervi-
sion, (ii) greater transparency of information related to 
government programs (functioning and execution) so as 
to make public sector information effectively accessible 
and understandable to citizens, (iii) implementation of 
training and motivation programs for civil servants and 
public managers, thus helping them internalize the im-
portance of proper professional practice and seeking to 
create a culture of whistleblowing regarding irregularities 
practiced in public service, (iv) conducting an analysis to 
determine whether a service should be provided by the 
government itself or be outsourced and (v) implementa-
tion of new governance mechanisms and strengthening of 
existing mechanisms such as the CGU audit, which could 
reduce both active and passive waste.
It should be stressed that although the CGU audit re-
ports present findings that can be questioned by mayors, 
the fact that there is a "point" in the report is already evi-
dence of the occurrence of certain types of waste. This is 
true because the report is supported by documents or lack 
of documents justifying specific actions performed by civil 
servants and municipal managers. However, this can also 
be considered a limitation of the study.
The following are suggested as points for future re-
search: (i) expanding the study to include the use of 
a larger healthcare database (the 2010 CGU audit re-
ports were used in this study, referring to lotteries 31 
and 32); (ii) increasing the number of variables used to 
identify active waste; and (iii) expanding the research 
to other areas of municipal governance that receive fe-
deral funds, such as education.
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 Annex
Municipalities that received special CGU auditing through the Lottery Program of Municipalities 
PUBLIC LOTTERY OF MUNICIPALITIES
31st 32nd
Draw order Municipality FU Draw order Municipality FU
1st  Mauá da Serra  PR 1st  Normandia  RR
2nd  Wenceslau Braz  PR 2nd  Douradina  MS 
3rd  Guaporema  PR 3rd  São Félix do Araguaia MT
4th  São Gabriel  BA 4th  Xambioá  TO 
5th  Itaparica  BA 5th  Nossa Senhora das Dores  SE 
6th  Palmas de Monte Alto  BA 6th  Cerejeiras  RO 
7th  Pojuca  BA 7th  Cardoso Moreira  RJ 
8th  Cachoeira  BA 8th  Anajás  PA 
9th  Arroio do Meio  RS 9th  Santa Filomena  PE 
10th  Doutor Ricardo  RS 10th  Pedro Velho  RN 
11th  Pouso Novo  RS 11th  Umirim  CE 
12th  Pedro Osório  RS 12th  Luziânia  GO 
13th  Jeriquara  SP 13th  Senador La Rocque MA 
14th  Ipuã  SP 14th  Imaculada  PB 
15th  Viradouro  SP 15th  São João da Serra  PI 
16th  Dracena  SP 16th  Peritiba  SC 
17th  Poloni  SP 17th  Doutor Pedrinho  SC 
18th  Coronel Xavier Chaves  MG 18th  Santo Inácio  PR 
19th  Capim Branco  MG 19th  Inajá  PR 
20th  São João da Lagoa  MG 20th  Heliópolis  BA 
21st  Carvalhos  MG 21st  Iuiú  BA 
22nd  Santo Antônio do Monte  MG 22nd  Erval Seco  RS 
23rd  Matias Barbosa  MG 23rd  Caseiros  RS 
24th  Frei Inocêncio  MG 24th  Votorantim  SP 
25th  Amajari  RR 25th  Ribeirão Branco  SP 
26th  Primavera de Rondônia  RO 26th  Bariri  SP 
27th  Tefé  AM 27th  Planura MG 
28th  Frei Paulo  SE 28th  Caxambu MG 
29th  Venda Nova do Imigrante  ES 29th  Senador Cortes MG 
continuous
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31st 32nd
Draw order Municipality FU Draw order Municipality FU
30th  Bonito  MS 30th  Campestre MG 
31st  Taquarana  AL 31st  Pedra Branca do Amapari  AP
32nd  Girau do Ponciano  AL 32nd  Maracaju  MS
33rd  Cabo Frio  RJ 33rd  Tabatinga AM
34th  Inhangapi  PA 34th  Curralinho  PA
35th  São Sebastião da Boa Vista  PA 35th  Nova Maringá  MT
36th  Itaituba  PA 36th  São Bento do Tocantins  TO
37th  Santa Rosa do Tocantins  TO 37th  Pedro Canário  ES
38th  Cocalinho  MT 38th  Pendências  RN
39th  Jardim do Seridó  RN 39th  Branquinha  AL
40th  Luís Gomes  RN 40th  Independência  CE
41st  Lucrécia  RN 41st  Surubim  PE
42nd  Timbaúba  PE 42nd  Penalva MA
43rd  Lagoa do Carro  PE 43rd  Alegrete do Piauí  PI
44th  Camutanga  PE 44th  Riacho dos Cavalos  PB
45th  Granja  CE 45th  Americano do Brasil  GO
46th  Jucás  CE 46th  Capinzal  SC
47th  Mucambo  CE 47th  Bom Jardim da Serra  SC
48th  Arari  MA 48th  Congonhinhas  PR
49th  Água Doce do Maranhão  MA 49th  Pinhalão  PR
50th  Mata Roma  MA 50th  Uibaí  BA
51st  Paes Landim  PI 51st  Arataca  BA
52nd  Dom Expedito Lopes  PI 52nd  Toropi  RS
53rd  Flores do Piauí  PI 53rd  Alto Alegre  RS
54th  Passagem  PB 54th  Pedregulho  SP
55th  Natuba  PB 55th  Vargem  SP
56th  Caldas Brandão  PB 56th  São João de Iracema  SP
57th  Carmo do Rio Verde  GO 57th  São Sebastião do Rio Verde MG
58th  Novo Gama  GO 58th  Abadia dos Dourados MG
59th  Piratuba  SC 59th  Felisburgo MG
60th  Caçador  SC 60th  Itamogi MG
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 APPendIx 1
To facilitate understanding of how the database was 
constructed, the following are provided as examples of 
data extracted from the reports of the Auditors of the 
CGU Auditing Program by Public Lotteries and classi-
fied according to the active and passive waste variables 
shown in Table 1.
Overinvoicing: "Basic medicines purchased at higher 
prices than the market price."
Bidding with diversion of funds: "Under-execution of 
the object compared to costs incurred, with a loss of at 
least R $ 24,026.67."
Lack of or poor performance of the council: "Lack of 
minimum conditions for the functioning of the Municipal 
Health Council of Bom Jardim da Serra, state of Santa Ca-
tarina-SC, no confirmation of the transmission of informa-
tion to the Council and low frequency of their meetings."
Lack of competitive bidding: "Company selected by in-
vitation without [the bidding process] meeting the require-
ment of a minimum of three valid tenders."
Non-occurrence of matching funds: "Non-achieve-
ment by the State and the Municipality of the amounts 
agreed for Basic Pharmacy drug distribution to the popu-
lation of the municipality."
Non-payment of taxes: "No proof of payment of social 
security contributions."
Unfinished work: "Stalled and unfinished works rela-
ting to Agreement No. EP 1445/2005 due to their abandon-
ment by the contractor, thus preventing the full attainment 
of the objectives pursued and harming the constitutional 
principles of efficiency and economy."
